D-Day was staged too (part 2/2)

9) The reason why the German high command didn't react the previous days and during the night of June 5/6

-    Verlaine's message the days preceding June 5

A first element that should have put on alert the German High Command was the message of Verlaine. The first part of it is broadcasted on June 1 at 9pm. Hellmuth Meyer, the intelligence officer of the 15th Army, captures it and understands its meaning. Indeed, a member of the French resistance paid by the Germans explained it to them. Meyer then sends it to Admiral Canaris, head of the German counter intelligence. The 15th Army is immediately put on alert.

Meyer then sends the message to the OKW, the HQ of Rundstedt, and that of Rommel. But even if Jodl sees the message, he doesn't do anything. He orders no warning for the 7th Army. The explanation is that he has assumed that Rundstedt had sent an alert message. Except that the latter had not done so because he thought the HQ of Rommel had. And about Rommel? Well, there is no official reason advanced. In any case, it seems he didn't take the message seriously; which is very strange, since he had said a few days before he thought that the landing would happen in the next 3 weeks.

The nights of 2 and 3 June, the message is transmitted again by the BBC.

June 4, nothing is done either. So for three long days, we have this extraordinary thing that the 15th army is put on alert, but the seventh is not due to malfunctions in the high command.

On June 5, at 9:15 pm (in European time, 10:15 pm UK time), the second part of the message is transmitted. Meyer immediately warns General von Salmuth, who is at the head of the 15th Army. This one puts the 15th army on maximum alert.

Rundstedt's HQ is informed immediately after. But Blumentritt, the Chief of Staff of Rundstedt does not believe in the veracity of the information. According to him, the allies would not be as stupid as to announce the radio landing. What about Rundstedt himself? We do not know. But in any case, the 7th Army is not put on alert by Rundstedt's HQ.

Near 10 pm, Meyer warns almost everyone (OKW, headquarters of Army Group B, etc ...) with the following message: "Teletype No 2117/26. Urgent. Message of BBC, 21.15, June 5 has been decoded. According to our available records it means "Expect invasion within 48 hours, starting 00.00, June 6".

One would think that he would also warn the 7th Army and 84th corps. But this action depends on the HQ of Army Group B (Speidel). This said, as this one was better disposed than Blumentritt, there was a hope that via the headquarters of Army Group B, the 7th Army be put on alert. But Speidel doesn't give them the information in question.

And so, during 5 days, the 7th Army wasn't put on alert. And not only that, but neither Rundstedt's headquarters in Saint-Germain en Laye, nor Kriegsmarine in Paris, nor Rommel's headquarters at La Roche-Guyon, nor OKW shows any reaction. It's a little too extraordinary to be true. This kind of thing doesn't happen, unless it's wanted.

And suddenly, the absence of various generals becomes even more suspicious. There is a warning that is given about an imminent landing, and yet, Rommel goes to Germany, the generals of the 7th Army leave to make a war game, and Admiral Krancke goes to Bordeaux? The least they should have done would have been to stay, just in case; especially since it's not as if they were unaware that the landing was going to take place soon.

Moreover, for the first part of the message, ok, there was a malfunction in the transmission of orders; but for the second, no putting the 7th Army on alert comes from the choice of Rundstedt's HQ. However, if he felt the need to put on alert the 15th army it is because he thought that despite the bad weather, a landing was possible. So why put the 15th Army on alert and not the 7th? Well, because it was essential to avoid that the 7th be; because then it could have caused the failure of the landing. So even if it introduced a big inconsistency, Jewish leaders preferred to do like that. They probably thought that anyway, it would suffice to say that the entire German high command didn't believe that the invasion would happen the following days, and that this explanation would go off without a hitch. And also, it would only be a nth detail which wouldn't be noticed and would only be known by a few specialists.

Blumentritt is supposed to have said it was ridiculous that the Allies announce the day of landing by radio. Except that it wasn't absurd at all, since it was necessary to warn the resistance as soon as possible so that they begin to sabotage the railways and the German communications. As if a general with the experience of Blumentritt could ignore it. And indeed, that's what has been going on for several days. Sabotage actions had multiplied in Normandy and Blumentritt was well placed to know it. And also, if the message is encrypted, no matter it is read by the enemy. But Blumentritt was certainly in the conspiracy and voluntarily played the naïve.

-    Cancellation of naval and air patrols

Since moving such a great fleet as the one of the D-day can't go unnoticed, how is it that the Germans were unable to quickly realize that the invasion began, and at least in the beginning, that it would take place in Normandy?

The boats left in the late evening (see here); so, around 11pm or so and probably earlier for certain ships that were located farer (in Dartmouth for example).

Normally, naval and air patrols should have signaled the presence of this huge fleet. We speak indeed of no less than 7,000 vessels, of which 1,200 warships. In less than an hour, the German high command should have known that the landing had begun, and the boats were heading towards Normandy.

But it has not happened. Why? Well, simply because both Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe patrols were canceled. This, first, because the German High Command considered that the weather conditions were dangerous (there was a storm), and secondly because he believed firmly that the Allies would not land in the next 2 days.

However, it probably wasn't that much the storm that was the problem, since at midnight, allied aircraft, including gliders, flied over Normandy. And at the same time, Allied boats left to their landing points. So, ships and German aircraft should have been able to patrol too.

Anyway, the two main elements of observation, which could have allowed to alert the German headquarters about the invasion from midnight with certainty, had been deactivated for the night.

We can say that it is one hell of a chance for the Allies. It was necessary that the storm be just strong enough to drive the Germans to remove their patrols, but not too much in order to allow the landing to happen. And even then, that day, nothing said to the Allies that the Germans would stop their patrols, both naval and aerial. If the Germans had been advised just 6 hours before that the landing was to take place in Normandy, it could have changed everything. But, what an incredible chance, the Germans canceled their patrols.

Especially that the initial choice of June 5 had been decided long before, on tidal height criteria, Moon which had to be full, etc ... The weather preferably had to be rather beautiful (a little cloudy at worst) and with low wind. But apparently, except if the weather made the landing impossible, it was mainly the criteria of tide and moon which predominated. So there was a huge risk to come a day where there would have been a very beautiful weather and where the German patrols would have been in action; which would have led to a risk just as great that the landing fail. So the stroke of luck to have had a weather just bad enough that German patrols were suspended, but good enough to allow the landing becomes even more extraordinary.

And cancellation of air patrols is very strange; because planes can fly in bad weather. And the weather at this time (during the 10pm-2am period) permitted it, since the Allied planes could well fly (and we talk not only about motorized airplanes, but also about gliders). Nothing would have prohibited the Germans to patrol. So, bad weather could not be evoked to justify the suspension of air patrols.

And in the article of the newspaper "le Point" about the Normandy landing, you find:

"0:34 am. After being warned by a listening station of the Luftwaffe that bombers of the US Air Force engage in missions of "meteorology"(Mercury flights) over the English Channel, Germans night fighters take off, patrol the indicated area... before going home, empty-handed."

So, there were German aircraft that could patrol that night. And in addition, they were present in the region.

Incidentally, at 02:30 am, the fixed transmitters "Bag Pipe" and "Chatter" from England get into action and scramble the communications of the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe (German Air Force).

So that means that before 2:30 am, the naval and air patrols could communicate with their staff. And the communication disruption is also something that should have highly alerted the German High Command on the fact that it was most likely the D-day.

-    Sources of information between midnight and 6 am

But the boats and ships weren't the only elements which could detect the armada before 6:00 am. Coastal radars and sonars allowed to see it come early. Airdrops, Allied bombings and sabotages carried out by the resistance, also gave strong indications on the fact that it was a landing.

In "The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rommel's Defense of Fortress Europe", it is said that the first clash between paratroopers and German soldiers arrived at 0:40am. And at 0:45am, two paratroopers were made prisoners just next to the headquarters of Friedrich-Wilhelm Richter, the commander of the 716th Division. This one has immediately informed the command of the 15th Army (von Salmuth). General Marcks, commander of the 84th corps is informed only around 1:45am.

At 2:06am: The Colonel Hamann, acting commander of the 709th Division, in turn calls Saint-Lô and reports enemy paratroopers near Sainte-Mere-Eglise. At 2:11am, the 716th tells him that paratroopers have landed east of the Orne, near Caen. It convinces Marcks it's the landing. He calls Pemsel, who is temporarily acting command of the 7th Army, minutes after.

At 2:29am, the ships of the U Force have arrived off the coast of Utah Beach and drop anchor 11.5 miles from shore (21 km). Another site says 15km and 2am.

In the book "D-Day: Minute by Minute", By Jonathan Mayo, page 107:

"2:40am. At his headquarters in Paris, the man in charge of the army located in France, Marshal von Rundstedt, studies the many reports from Normandy. The headquarters of the Navy say their radar screens are covered with hundreds of beeps; at the beginning, the operators thought their equipment had a problem.

Rundstedt is not impressed. He replies "perhaps a flock of seagulls?"

Furthermore, he is convinced that the airdrops are a ruse for covering the real invasion which will be at Calais. He doesn't consider the situation as being important enough to disturb Rommel in his home in Germany."

So the radars (most probably coastal ones) also detect the presence of the armada in Normandy. This probably around 2:20am or at least 2:30am, since if Rundstedt reviews these reports at 2:40am, it's that the observations were made at least 10 or 20 minutes before.

At 2:51am, the ships of the O Force have arrived off Omaha Beach and drop anchor 11 miles (21 km) from shore.

Just before 3am, Cherbourg naval station tells to general Pemsel that it have detected by radar and sonar maneuvering vessels in the Bay of Seine (between Cherbourg and Le Havre). Since the 0 and U Forces have arrived, one can imagine that it is them who have been identified.

At 3:14am, the commander of the coastal troops is informed that naval units have been detected 11 km off Grandcamp (in front of Omaha Beach).

Around 5:15am, Major Werner Pluskat looks at the sea with binoculars (on the beach located near Eterham, east of Omaha Beach). He sees the vast Allied armada. He immediately calls Major Block at the HQ of the 352nd division to describe what he sees (that said, himself says 3h30 here).

So from 2am, things should have begun to be clear to everyone. And at 3am, because of radar and sonar detection, there shouldn't have been any doubt remaining. This means that 3 or 4 hours before the landing, the Germans should have been put immediately in battle order and should have flocked to the beaches.

-    The explanation for the lack of German reaction: the belief that the landing couldn't be done that night and that if there was one in Normandy, it would be just an decoy

So how did the Jewish leaders make to explain the absence of German reaction despite the information that clearly showed it was the landing?

Well, again, Jewish leaders have used Operation Fortitude. The explanation for the lack of German reaction is that the high command was sure that the landing would be neither that day nor that place.

So the information came. But the high command has not listened to them, considered them to be false, or said that it was only a diversionary operation and not the real landing. So, the hours between 1am and 6am have been lost, ensuring a little more the success of the Allied operation.

It is essentially Speidel, Rundstedt and Jodl, who then played the role of decision makers blocked in their a priori.

• The time between 2am and 4am

As we have seen, it's around 2am that Marcks realizes that it is the landing and calls Pemsel. Around 2:15am, the latter then calls his superior, General Speidel, who replaces Rommel at the head of Army Group B during his absence. So, from 2:15am, the German defense should have been put in place. But Speidel doesn't believe that the invasion can be made a day of such bad weather. And also, he thinks that the invasion will be in the Pas-de-Calais. Thus, he tells Pemsel to do nothing and hangs up.

And this situation will be repeated during the following hours.

A few minutes after 2:15am, it's von Salmuth, the head of the 15th Army, who phones Speidel. He said he heard distinctly by the phone machine gun noises when he telephoned General Reichert, who commands the 711th division. But again, Speidel refuses to believe that the invasion has begun.

To quote again the extract from the book of Jonathan Mayo mentioned above, we therefore observe that at 2:40am, von Rundstedt had received clear and crisp information on the presence of vessels. But he refuses to consider them as true. And anyway, he thinks that the real landing will take place in the north. So he does nothing.

Just after this extract (always at 2:40am), we learn that:

"However, at the headquarters of the 84th Corps, General Marcks has seen enough. He ordered that the Viebig code (which means" invasion ") be sent to all units.

Marcks wants to mobilize the only tank division near enough to be effective, the 21th division. They have already participated in many actions, many men fought with Rommel in North Africa. Marcks contacted Rundstedt in Paris, and even the German High Command in Berlin, but each refused permission. They too are not convinced that this is the real invasion."

So Marcks wants to mobilize the 21th Panzer Division from 2:40am. But Rundstedt and the high command of Berlin refuse.

A little further, on page 112:

"3:12am: A signal is sent by General Max Pemsel, Chief of Staff of the 7th army, to his chief Hans Speidel (Chief of Staff of Army Group B) at the headquarters of Rommel, in la Roche-Guyon.

'Engine noises audible from the sea, on the east coast of the Cotentin. Admiral, Channel coast, reports naval vessels offshore Cherbourg, by radar.'

In the same way that he had not been impressed earlier by the excitement of his friend von Schramm about Verlaine's poem, Speidel remains impassive."

So, at 3:12am, audible motor noises, coming from the sea, are heard. Radars report the presence of ships off Cherbourg. But Speidel again refuses to consider such information.

Page 117, we find: "3:40am, the General Hans Speidel orders that the following message be sent to General Pemsel: "Western Army Commander in Chief (Rundstedt so) doesn't consider this as a major operation"."

So Speidel managed to have Rundstedt on the phone. And, a little earlier than 3:40am, this one answered that he didn't consider all this as a major operation.

In short, between 2am and 4am, Speidel and Rundstedt play skeptics and refuse to consider that the landing will happen that day, or at least that the operation is something else than a simple diversion.

• The time between 4am and 9am

During the 4am-6am period, Speidel still doesn't believe in the invasion.

Rundstedt also continues to not to believe in it, but given the scale at which the airdrops are done, he doubts a little bit. So as a precaution, he orders at 4:30am that the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr be sent immediately to Caen.

To save precious time, he orders this before asking OKW the permission to do it. As we have seen, these troops are indeed under the direct command of Hitler. But the OKW didn't approve. And at 6:30am, while the first maneuvers of landings have begun, Jodl reports that the two divisions can't be brought before Hitler give the order. But Hitler was asleep and Jodl refused to wake him. So Rundstedt has had to cancel his order and the two divisions have spent the morning waiting.

So, at around 4:30am, Rundstedt undertakes to do something. But then, he is blocked by Jodl.

Once again in the book "D-Day: Minute by Minute", By Jonathan Mayo, page 125, we learn that at 5am, the reaction of Speidel had still not changed.

"5am. In Rommel's headquarters, La Roche-Guyon, in an anteroom where just hours before they were plotting the downfall of Hitler, Hans Speidel, Chief of Staff of Rommel, is having coffee with Major Wilhelm von Schramm, Admiral Friedrich Ruge who is the naval adviser of Rommel, and Colonel Anton Staubwasser who is an officer of counterespionage. They discuss reports indicating the presence of paratroopers enemies along the coastal region. Speidel is silent and preoccupied, "we must wait and see, and discover the importance of all this before committing more forces"."

So, while at 5am, all was now very clear, Speidel was still waiting to see what all this was really about.

At 6:15am, Max Speidel informs Pemsel that there are massive aerial and naval bombardments. At 6:45am, Pemsel reports to Rundstedt's HQ that landings have begun. But he adds that the 7th Army should be able to manage the problem alone. Because of this news, Salmuth, commanding the 15th Army, goes to bed; Speidel also, and most of Rommel's staff at La Roche-Guyon.

Later, between 6:45am and 8:15am, when everything had already begun, neither Rundstedt nor the OKW were convinced that this was the real invasion. Jodl asks Rundstedt "are you sure that it is the invasion?". Rundstedt replies, "according to my reports, it could be a diversionary attack." Inevitably, it doesn't help to convince the OKW that they have to send the panzers.

It is only with a phone call at 8:15 am, full of details about the vast armada of boats, that the High Command was finally convinced that it was a major operation, and not a small diversion.

So we can assume that if Rundstedt has sent panzers, it was because it would have been fishy that no one do anything. With the order of moving the panzers, this problem was solved. But as Rundstedt was in the conspiracy, he had to sabotage this action by the statement that he still believed in a possible diversion. Thus, it was quite easy for Jodl to say that since the highest present general thought it was just a diversion, or at least it could be a diversion, there was no reason to send the tanks.

The Jewish leaders could have made that Rundstedt believe in a major landing. He was not completely necessary for the goal of justifying the decision of Jodl. Speidel could be enough to support it. But with Rundstedt in addition, it was better.

Incidentally, the declaration of Pemsel saying that the 7th Army will be able to manage the problem alone shows that he too was part of the conspiracy. Otherwise, he would have made a hue and cry about the arrival of the 12th Panzer, Panzer Lehr and of all other divisions available. In making this statement, he allowed to justify a little more the lack of response from the OKW.

-    To sum up

So basically, when the message of Verlaine to inform the resistance is transmitted, the German high command refuses to believe it because of the idea that the landing can't be done by bad weather.

Then, between 23pm and 0:30am, the high command is blind because he removed the naval and air patrols. And in fact, this problem of lack of naval or air patrol persists until 5:15 am; when the invasion can finally be seen with the naked eye from the beaches.

Between 0:30am and 2am, the first airdrops begin. But the high command considers that there is not enough evidence this is a major operation. So he waits.

Between 2am and 4am, things are already quite clear. And some are convinced that this is the landing, of whom Marcks and Pemsel. But Speidel and Rundstedt, their superiors, refuse to believe it.

Between 4am and 8am: Rundstedt takes action at 4:30am (sending two panzer divisions), but still doesn't really believe in anything other than a diversion. And neither Speidel nor Jodl believes in a major operation. Thus, Jodl blocks any movement of panzers. So, from there, it's Jodl who blocks everything. And the opinions of Speidel and Rundstedt on the situation are obviously not likely to make him change his mind.

And at 6:45am, Pemsel finishes convincing Speidel, Rundstedt and Jodl to do nothing by saying that anyway, even if the first landings have taken place, the 7th Army will manage that alone without problems.

So, in fact, the problem is that it was very difficult to remove land radars and sonars observation and almost impossible to prevent the soldiers at observation posts to become visually aware of the presence of the armada. Not counting the airdrops and bombings. So, another explanation had to be found regarding the lack of reaction from the high command. The cancellation of naval and aerial patrols allowed to buy time until 1 or 2 am. But after, something else had to be found. The belief of German high generals, thanks to Operation Fortitude, that the landing would be done neither that day, nor that place, was the reason used each time to justify this inaction.

The problem is that it was becoming more and more ridiculous and sleazy as the night progressed. Multiple reports clearly showed that this was a major operation. When at 7 am, while the first landings have taken place, Jodl is still reluctant to wake Hitler and send the panzers, it becomes grotesque.

10) The hunt for paratroopers

Some things could have been done with the 3 or 4 divisions present in the landing zone. But again, it seems that the defeat has been organized (recall from the map shown at the beginning, only the 91th, 352nd and 21th divisions were mobile and could therefore move to reinforce other units, divisions 243, 709, 716 and 711 were not or little).

In the area of Utah Beach, for example, the High Command should have made rush part of the 91th to the beaches. But no, it was sent to hunt for paratroopers (near 2:30-3am); and not only it, but also a part of the 709th. As a result, there won't be enough soldiers to fight on Utah Beach to counter the landing.

They could have used a little of the 243rd. Even if it was not mobile, there probably was the possibility of transporting some of the troops or make them walk. Airdrops areas were only 25-30 km away. But no, this division stays where it is.

So the only mobile unit that is present in the area near Cherbourg, and which could come close to the beaches to counter the landing, the 91st, is busy chasing parachutists instead of going to strengthen the 709th. And the 709th itself is divided (and in addition, it's its mobile part which is sent against the paratroopers, See Defenders of Fortress Europe, Samuel W. Mitcham jr). Inevitably, these troops will be sorely missed during the landing.

In the book "Invasion", Benoit Rondeau, we learn, page 120, that on Utah and Omaha, the Germans have committed only 1,000 men. So, on Omaha, the 352nd Division, led by General Kraiss, had maybe 600 or 700 men present. Wikipedia talks of 2,000 men: "The German units defending the Omaha area has a workforce of 2,000 men". The newspaper "Le Point" (May 27, 2004) even talks about 350 soldiers "Over the assault waves, the 350 German soldiers deployed on Omaha Beach end up being overwhelmed by the number of attackers".

Yet, on the Wikipedia page about this division, it is said that there were three German regiments of the 352nd division on site (the 914th, the 916th and 726th. 726th originally belonged to the 716th Division, but the 1st and 3rd battalions had been put under the command of the 352nd division). And, as noted above, a regiment consists of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers. Therefore, at Omaha, there should have been between 6,000 and 8,000.

But the regiments were not complete. As we have seen, for the 726th regiment, there were only two battalions, that is around 1,300 men. For the 914th, same things. There was only the 1st and the 2nd battalion; so there again, 1,300 men. And the 916th regiment had only one battalion present on the two it possessed; so, around 1000 men. In all, there were only 3,600 men.

And the Allies have landed only on some parts of the beach (it was 30 km long). Therefore, only a part of the 352nd was involved. Most of the two battalions of the 914th Regiment were west of Omaha, a place where there will be little or no fighting. Same thing for the 726th regiment; over 40% is located in the west.

And also, the 916th was established mainly 2 or 3 km inland and therefore didn't face the Allies on Omaha beaches.

This map allows to see which German units faced the allies on Omaha Beach:

As we can see, there are 5 companies of the 726th Regiment, and 2 of the 916th, where the Allied divisions attacked. A German company normally had 145 men. So, theoretically, there were 1,015 men on this part of the beach (725 of the 726th regiment and 290 of the 916th). One of the maps that I could see also talked about a company of the 914th regiment located west of the landing zone. So, in this case there were 1,160 men to prevent the Allies to establish a bridgehead on the beaches.

But on the Wikipedia page about the 716th Division, we are told: "The division, which was very weak on June 6, 1944, was soon worn out (of approximately 4000 men, 860 were killed ...)". And, on the same page, we are told that this division was supposed to have normally about 8,000 men. So, the day of the landing, it was only at 50% of its original strength. This means that of the 725 men of the 726th regiment there were only 360 actually present. So, there wouldn't have been 1,015 men present, but 650; and maybe 795 if we add the potential company of the 914th Regiment.

So, we have a figure of approximatively 650-800 men.

We are told that US troops have been on the verge of reembarking at Omaha. So, with the reinforcement of only 1.000 or 2,000 men on the beaches, things could have evolved completely differently.

What were the other men of the 352nd doing? Well, part of them countered the British in Gold Beach (a third of the 914th Regiment, part of the 916th, and the artillery regiment). But another part, the reserve, also called Meyer group (consisting of the 915th regiment and a battalion: that is normally within 3 or 4,000 men, commanded by General Meyer) was first inland to maneuver to the airborne troops. More precisely, the reserve has left from the vicinity of Bayeux to go to Carentan, located 40 km away (order given at 3:10 am). So, here too, rather than going to the beaches, where the bulk of the invasion was going to come, they focused on the paratroopers.

One explanation is however provided. The high command believed that the Allies would land at high tide and the reserve troops would have all the time to return. But they landed at half tide, well before. So, the reserve was not there at the beginning of the landing and there were only between 650 and 800 German soldiers to oppose to 34,000 American soldiers.

That said, since the reserve wasn't far from the beaches of Omaha, it had time to come back to them and change the course of the events in Omaha by withdrawing early. And precisely, there was an order saying they had to come back to the east. Indeed, at 5:50 am, Kraiss realizes that the threat of paratroopers isn't real where the division is going, (so, toward Carentan). It was apparently dummies. So, he should have made rush his soldiers to the beaches immediately.

In addition, the Meyer group hadn't had time to go too far. The head of the group was only at the Cerisy forest, located 17 km from the starting point. That is to say that during 2h40, they only made 17 km, that is a speed of 6.3 km/h. Pouncing toward Colleville right now, which was 15 km away, they could arrive in 2h20, and be there at 8:10 am. And perhaps less, because when they started at 3:10 am, time was needed to put the unit in motion. While now, the reserve was already in this state. We will see a little further than the High Command estimated that they could be there in 1h55. So they could arrive at 7:45 am. It could still do it, since the German troops present there managed to resist during a good part of the morning.

But then, inexplicably, General Kraiss lets the reserve do nothing during 1h45. Until 7:35am, whereas the news of the landing was given at 6:30 am, the reserve remains stationary.

And at 7:35 am, he sends a third of the Meyer group (the battalion I/915) on the center of Omaha Beach, north of Colleville, which is 15 km away. The battalion was supposed to arrive at 9:30 am. This is good, since it's actually where most of the action takes place. But, because of the air and naval attacks, the unit will be very late and will be able to engage the enemy only during the afternoon.

Regarding the rest of the Meyer group (the battalion II/915 and a rifle battalion), it was not until 8:35 am that he finally decides to make it move. So, two-thirds of the troops have remained unmoving for almost 3 hours. And then, instead of sending them to the nearest point where they can be useful, that is around Colleville, at Omaha, he sends them squarely to Gold Beach, around Arromanches, located 20 km from there. Again, these units will be late because of enemy fire, and this time won't arrive until late afternoon.

In short, because of the miscalculations and changes of opinion of Kreiss, the entire Meyer group was useless during the most crucial part of the day.

However, as seen before, it was originally very well located to intervene in time at Omaha Beach. Indeed, these troops were near Bayeux, just 12 km from the beaches of Omaha where the bulk of the landing will be. So, going to the beaches from 3am, they had plenty of time to position themselves. And then, it wouldn't have been between 650 and 800 soldiers who would have been present to resist to the landing at 6am, but 4,000 or 5,000. And there, the landing at Omaha, would have had a much greater probability of turning into failure.

And also, the story about hunting for paratroopers located 40 km away is fishy.

First, there was no hope of reaching the paratroopers, beating them and then being able to return in time to Omaha Beach. Especially of beating them, because getting rid of paratroopers could take the day or days. So, there was very little chance of making them much harm before the landing (because if there were paratroopers, it was inevitably that there was a landing). It is true that the Germans thought that the Allies would land at high tide. But it couldn't in any way be an absolute certitude. The Allies could land earlier than expected (and they did, they landed only at half-tide). And even if they didn't, it would have taken too much time to beat them, or even simply to attack them and then to disengage from the fight. After that, Allied aircraft and navy could immobilize the Germans during the return trip. So going to hunt the Allied paratroopers located 40 km away was really ridiculous.

And in the configuration of a landing, paratroopers couldn't be mobile units, but static ones only used to hold strategic points and block the German units. So there was no fear of being attacked from rear on Omaha and Gold Beach. And, given their position, their role was clear. These units were used to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to the landing beaches. And given the very small number of men present at Omaha and Gold, it was unwise to send the Meyer Group in Carentan. It was the only major mobile unit present on site and therefore being able to lend a hand to those located on the beaches. And units on the beaches were so weak it was clear that facing tens of thousands of allied soldiers, they would be massacred. Thus, it was necessary, first, to bring the reserve closer to the beaches from 3am. As at that time, the Germans didn't know where the landing was going to happen, they had to send it around Trévières in order to be in a place to intervene quickly as well to the west or to the center or to the east of Omaha. And once the landing zone identified, around 5 am, it had to rush to the beaches to reinforce the very weak units located in Omaha. So make them go to Carentan was clearly sabotage. It allowed to justify the late arrival of the reserve to the landing beaches.

So there was no justification for the fact of making Meyer group wait where it was until 7:35 am.

Moreover, regarding the tactic choice of Kreiss to make wait the rest of the group until 8:30 am, what one might think, is that he has probably thought that he had to keep a part of the reserve waiting to fill gaps if some places began to collapse. And then, when Gold Beach began to be in difficulty, while in Omaha, things were under control, he sent the reserve to Gold Beach. It seems to be a wise solution. But in fact, given the situation, it was not. It was clear that soon, it would be the Apocalypse, because of the firing of Allied ships. So, the movement of German troops would be greatly hampered by the navy. And locations threatening to collapse would have ample time to do so well before the reserve be there. And if that part of the reserve was too late, the allies would have had ample time to strengthen. And then, it was clear that the 2,000 German soldiers would be swept away. It is not with so few men against probably 10 or 20,000 Allied soldiers that they were going to do much. Especially with the reinforcement of allied ships and possibly aircraft. And that's what happened; they were massacred. So instead of waiting, the rest of the reserve rather had to rush as fast as possible to the beaches to stop the landing where Allied troops were still very vulnerable. So the fact of waiting until 8:35 am, that is to say 2h45 in all, here again was sabotage.

And even with the Kreiss strategy, it was necessary to come near the beaches much earlier. The other part of the reserve should have gotten closer to the beaches from the start, in order to be located 5 km from them and to intervene as soon as possible. Given the slow movement of these units (6 km/h), worsen by the bombing, keeping the rest of the reserve 15-20 km away also fell under sabotage.

So they had to go on the beach immediately. Then there was the problem of choosing one or more sides to go. It's not the biggest problem, but we can think about it. Should they send the majority of troops in Omaha, or two-thirds, or otherwise emphasize Gold Beach, as Kreiss did?

In this case, I think they had to focus Omaha, because it cut the Allied front in a more interesting place than Gold. Indeed, the troops located in Utah couldn't easily return to Omaha, because of the mouth of the Vire River and that of Carentan channel. Whereas if Omaha was taken by the Allies but not Gold, troops located in Omaha could attack from rear the German divisions trying to block the allies at Sword and Juno Beach. But anyway, the most crucial problem was mostly to send as soon as possible the reserve on the beaches.

Incidentally, the fact of having put mostly troops of the 716th Division on the beaches of Omaha and Gold, which consisted of elderly man, convalescent and foreigners, and the fact that only 50 % of the this division was present during the D-day, most likely falls under conspiracy. Once again, it was staged in order to facilitate as much as possible the landing for the Allies.

Regarding the 21st Panzer, the other mobile unit positioned not too far from the beaches, it too, rather than rushing toward them, hunts down paratroopers. Between 1 and 4:30 am, only part of the division is engaged. At 4:30 am, Speidel sends the whole division fight against airborne troops. But, the English are east of the Orne River, northeast of the city of Caen. So, the Germans are taken away from Sword Beach. It's only at 10:30 am, while the landing has begun 4 hours ago, that General Marcks, who apparently took command, finally decides to send it to the beaches. But, at that time, much of the division is inextricably involved in the fighting against the allied troops. And, it's only at 1pm that Feuchtinger, the commander of the 21th Division, decides to keep on site the elements the most committed in the fighting and make the others go to Sword Beach. In the end, a third remains (about 5,000 men), and two-thirds go to the beaches (10,000).

Of course, it takes time to regroup units. But in addition, as the English seized the bridge between Ranville and Bénouville and it's the only one allowing quick access to Sword Beach, the troops which are sent to the beaches must take a detour and return to Caen, to cross the Orne. Of course, it makes them lose even more time; especially since the French civilians flee and impede traffic on the bridges. In the end, it is not until 4:20 pm that the 21st division will exit Caen and engage Allies near Périer. The English will obviously have had the time to create an important bridgehead and it will be already much too late.

A small breakthrough will be created. The rest of the division has been split into two groups, and the second one (named Rauch) achieves to sneak to the beach without being detected. Indeed, there is a gap between the British and Canadian forces. The Rauch Group therefore joins the 111th Battalion of the 736th Infantry Regiment, in Saint-Aubin-sur-Mer. The action is beautiful. But without reinforcement, it can't be exploited. And the 12th Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr will be put under the command of the 7th Army only around 19 pm. So there will be no reserves to exploit the breakthrough and this one will come to nothing.

So, at 4:30 am, Speidel sends the entire 21st Panzer Division to hunt for paratroopers. However, at that time, things are becoming clearer about the landing. So, most of the division should be kept where it is, in order to be able to rush to the beaches. And assuming that at 4:30 am, Speidel has still a slight doubt, he shouldn't have it anymore at 5:20 am, when he is warned that Major Pluskat visually detected the armada. And, at this time, he still has time to cancel his order of sending the whole division toward the paratroopers. Normally, the 21st Division doesn't have already engaged them.

In addition, the two areas of allied forces airdrops clearly serve to prevent German divisions in the periphery to come help the units located within these two areas. They therefore indicate where the landing will happen (in the middle of the two areas of course). And the seizure of Bénouville bridge is another indication in this direction. It shows that it is at the north-west of Caen that the landing will take place. Indeed, since the 21st Panzer Division was located east of the city, the aim of taking the bridge could only be to prevent it moving westward. And anyway, at 5:15 am, Allied ships were now visible and German soldiers saw that they weren't to the east of Caen, but to the west. So at least around 5:30 am, the division should have been sent to Sword Beach. The fact that, instead of that, the entire division is sent to combat paratroopers, and that the German HQ orders the withdrawal only at 10:30 am is pure and simple sabotage there again.

Incidentally, the 21th Panzer Division was a unit with a lot of obsolete tanks. It had 85 Panzer IV, almost like other armored divisions. But instead of the 70 regulatory Panthers, it had French tanks taken after the victory of 1940. Again, Jewish leaders made sure to prepare the defeat by putting weak units.

So, the 2 mobile units not very far from the beaches, and even a part of the 709th and 352nd division are now wasting precious time to hunt paratroopers, while a part of these troops should be rushing to the beaches to reinforce already present units. Moreover, the reserve of the 352nd division is doing rubbish. All this doesn't depend on luck or error. The German generals deliberately weakened the defense near the beaches for the Allies have almost a boulevard in front of them.

Incidentally, regarding Omaha, books speak of near disaster for Americans. But in fact, throughout the day, there were only 10% of losses (which apparently includes the wounded) and only 3% of deaths (including ¼ drowned), that is 3000 soldiers for the losses and just over 1,000 for the deaths; this, for 34,000 landed soldiers. It's difficult to see how it could have been a disaster with losses like that. For a landing, they are more or less normal losses.

But what we can think is that at least one place had to be presented as having been very difficult. Otherwise, the landing would have looked like a walk in the park. On all other beaches, everything went almost without problem. If it had been the case on all, it would have ended up being fishy. So, to avoid that, Jewish leaders presented the operation at Omaha as having been on the verge of failing.

Apparently, the US military wants to remain vague on the exact count of injured and dead. We can think it's because it actually inflated losses. Perhaps there haven't been 3,000, but only 1,000 or 1,500. In the same vein, coincidentally, almost all of the 119 photos taken by the sole photographer present that day in Omaha (the Jew Robert Capa, born Endre Friedmann) have been lost, and the 11 that have been saved are blurred (by the way, only one photographer, that too is cheesy). Here too, it must be so that we don't notice that things happened much easier than what we are officially told.

11) The justification of the German lack of preparation by the bad weather

All this unpreparedness is justified, we are told, by the mistaken belief of the Germans that the storm would last until June 10 and would prevent the Allies to land.

We are also told that if the Germans were not aware of the change of weather, it is partly because they had lost their weather station in Greenland. Thus, they couldn't predict the weather as well as before.

But then, the consequence of it should have been that knowing they were in ignorance about the upcoming weather, the Germans should have remained mobilized permanently. They would have known they could not afford to rely on the weather to slacken. And they knew that the landing was probably imminent. Indeed, the allies were not going to wait until the Russians have crushed Germany to intervene. And precisely, the thing was looming quickly on the horizon. It began to be a debacle for the German army. And on June 22, the Russian were already at the frontier of Germany. On August 19, they were at almost 500 km of Berlin. Without an immediate response from the Allies, Russia would dominate Europe. So it was almost certain that the Allies would land in 2 or 3 months to prevent that. Besides, Rommel had said a few days before the landing he was almost certain that this one would happen in the next three weeks.

Anyway, at the time, the weather forecast was of very low quality. So even with better coverage, they should have remained careful all the time; especially in the vicinity of the summer, the most propitious moment for an invasion.

And they should have stayed even more mobilized precisely because they had canceled the air and naval patrols. Being blind then, the slackening of ground forces was unthinkable.

So the justification of the German demobilization because of the weather doesn't hold. The reality is that they have voluntarily given the Allies a free hand. They did it because the war was bogus and at that time, the scenario said they had to lose.

We are also told that during the night of June 5 to 6, the German staff didn't consider the presence of airborne troops as evidence of the landing. Again, it's a problem. Since the German estimated that the bad weather would last until June 10, the presence of these soldiers didn't make sense. Why would the Allies have sent troops without any hope of support to be massacred during 4 days, especially since it could put the Germans on the alert? So if there wasn't a planned invasion, it was nonsense. And if there was a planned one, but only for June 10, it didn't make much sense either, since it placed the Germans in highest alert and that during that time, the airborne troops would to be slaughtered. The only explanation was that the landing had started. Then, yes, it could be a diversion for a landing further north. But that was another problem. The German armies should have immediately been put in motion to counter a landing on the Normandy coast (and possibly to the north of course).

12) A weather and forecasts a little too perfect

Since there was bad weather, how have the Allies been able to make the landing? Indeed it is recognized by virtually all experts in the field that a storm could have made totally fail the landing. Normally, it should have been postponed.

The answer is that the weather has changed overnight. And as the Allies had the advantage of having weather stations in England, and the weather is usually spread from west to east on the French coast, they could predict the weather while the German couldn't. Moreover, it is said that Allied meteorologists were better than the Germans. So the Allies knew that the weather would improve, while the Germans didn't.

It is one hell of a luck. It was even the best possible configuration. If the weather had been beautiful, or even just moderately bad, the Germans could have used their aerial and naval surveillance and report much earlier the landing. And if the weather had been really bad, the landing couldn't have taken place. There, they were just in the perfect moment where the weather was bad enough for the Germans don't use their surveillance aircraft and boats, but where it was going to be beautiful enough for the landing can be made. And another stroke of luck, Allies forecasters had indeed predicted the weather correctly despite their limited means.

The problem still, is that meteorology was in a totally primitive state at the time. So it was still very difficult to say reliably that the weather would improve on the French coast. The forecast actually fell under mostly guesswork; which makes this prediction story very fishy.

So this story of weather and perfect forecast is a little too good to be true. But Jewish leaders had to invent this story. Without it, either the Germans could patrol and see the landing coming much earlier, or the landing wouldn't have been possible. So either it became very difficult to justify the German unpreparation or there was no landing at all.

13) The D-Day and illuminati symbols

We know that the Jewish leaders like to put numerological signs everywhere, notably the number 666. They also did it for the D-Day.

The landing started around 6:00 am on the 6th day of the 6th month. And if you quibble about the hour, it started on the 6th day of the 6th month of the 6th year of the war.

Incidentally, it is said that the sun rose at 5:58 am that day. Now, we know that in their rituals, there are many references to the sun. And, 5 + 5 + 8 = 18 = 6 + 6 + 6.

All this implies that the landing was planned for that day. So, the weather, unless apocalyptic, didn't matter. It's even possible that the media lied about the weather there really was between June 1 and 6, to make believe that there was an unexpected postponement of a day, when in fact, it was the date chosen from the start.

That said, it is possible that they had a Plan B. June 18 could have possibly done it. Here, too, there is a figure that gives an equivalent of 666. But it still was less perfect than the 6th hour of the 6th day of the 6th month.

Summary of various inconsistencies and suspicious elements

We will classify this summary according to the shady or illogical nature of the various elements, with the fishiest ones first. Well, the ranking is not necessarily perfect. The importance of a particular point relative to another can be discussed. But it is to give an idea.

1) The landing itself, which necessarily rested on huge strokes of luck to succeed (those in the following list).

Imagine that the Germans have not canceled the air and naval patrols, that the 91st and 21st divisions were used, that the 12th, the 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr have been located closer, and that they were sent on time, things could have turned into a defeat for the Allies. So, all this was incredibly risky. The decision to make the landing clearly implies that the Allies knew that the Germans were going to do bullshit.

2) The fact that Hitler chose a clearly losing in-between strategy. He always had strong views. But all of a sudden, he's hesitant, influenced and choosing a compromise.

3) The fact of not having awakened Hitler at such a crucial moment.

4) Continuing to not send the 15th army when the Allied troops received more and more reinforcement in Normandy. And this, until late July.

5) The cancellation of air and naval patrols, and at the same time, the absence of many generals.

6) The fact of not sending a part of the available mobile troops immediately to the beaches; and instead of that, taking these troops and some of those located on the beaches to go hunting paratroopers.

7) All the hesitations from the German generals about the fact that it was not at a landing, and if so, whether or not it was a diversion for an invasion in the north. This whereas the information communicated didn't leave any doubt from at least 3am.

8) The choice by the Allied command of the day and time of the landing clearly displaying an illuminati type reference.

9) The fact of not having put in alert the 7th Army during the 5 days following the decoding of the first message announcing the landing (the text of Verlaine).

10) The too perfect weather and forecasts.

11) That the Germans did not try to discover what was really behind Operation Fortitude by making low-altitude flights or sending commandos.

12) Completely lame hierarchical organization of the German army located in France.

13) The choice of putting the 2nd Panzer Division far away, to a place where it wouldn't be able to intervene quickly during the D-Day, either in Normandy or in the North.

14) After the D-Day, the fact that Hitler prohibits divisions located near Cherbourg to move back, which makes them lose a lot of men unnecessarily and accelerates the conquest of this very important city strategically speaking, since it was the only one in the region to have a deep water port.

All this can't have happened by coincidence. So, it's quite clear that the D-Day was staged. It's another example of how Hitler and the Jewish leaders did to make Germany lose, and of the fact that the course of World War II was arranged and planned.

PS: Why the landing in Normandy and not in the North? Since Jewish leaders could do almost what they wanted, they could have justified a success in the north. It would have made things easier.

Yes, but in Normandy, it allowed to explain that there was a very well defended area (the north) and another not (Normandy). It allowed to justify that much of the troops have remained in the north to wait a second invasion after the first landing. And it allowed to explain a slow arrival of German divisions. So it offered many advantages.

With an attack in the north, that is, where the Germans were supposed to wait, none of that was justifiable. The army was supposed to wait resolutely the landing. And once this one achieved, it's the whole German army which would have attacked them immediately. There, Hitler could not justify that the troops arrive slowly, saying he expected that the main attack be elsewhere. So the landing would have been extremely unlikely to succeed without accumulating inconsistencies and quirks much more numerous and greater than those we have seen in the present article.

PS2: apparently, Hitler maintained a big strength in Norway (500,000 men), to protect the supply of iron, essential for Germany. However, after the invasion of Italy, there was little chance that the Allies open a second front in a minor country (although crucial economically for Germany) and so well defended. Moreover, without an invasion of France, it would have rather given the keys of Europe to Stalin (if Germany had collapsed due to lack of steel). And it was obvious that it wasn't what the Allied leaders wanted. And if there was an invasion of France also scheduled, it led to a dispersion of Allied forces. So it should have been obvious that there was little risk that the allies attack Norway. Thus, Hitler would have been able to repatriate 200 or 250,000 men to put them on the beaches of the Pas-de-Calais and, above all, of Normandy. Or even only 100,000: it would not have changed much the defense of Norway and it would have greatly strengthened the one of Normandy (about 9 divisions more). If he did not, it's once again to be able to make Germany lose the battle of the landing more easily.