The second part of the liberation of France in 1944: Operation Lüttich, another sabotage by Hitler

 

I talked about the first part of the liberation of France in my article on the landing. I thought that after that, things weren't so interesting anymore. But when I watched a documentary in the summer of 2019, I realized that there were a few elements worthy of interest that showed once again that Hitler was an agent in the service of the elite.

This documentary was about Operation Lüttich, decided by Hitler and which took place from August 7 to 13, 1944, just one week after the Allies began to break through the front in southern Normandy. Some could think it is only one battle among others, and therefore only of moderate interest. That's what I thought at the beginning of the documentary. But in fact, it was this battle that decided of the rest of the French campaign and was the last major battle at that time.

The situation was as follows. After the landing on June 6, 1944, the Allies advanced for two or three weeks. Then they were stuck in the Normandy bocage and could only advance very slowly for about a month (June-July).

Then, between 25 and 31 July, they finally managed to make a breakthrough to the south-west of the front, towards Avranches (Operation Cobra). At the beginning of August, they began to spread south, east and north.

 

The situation is then catastrophic for the Germans. Indeed, if they stay on their positions, they are sure to be surrounded and lose more than half of their troops, or even almost all of them. Here is the front line as of July 31:

 

 

 

What is almost certain to happen is a large encircling movement on the part of the allies (red arrow).

 

 

 And the Germans clearly cannot make a counter-attack, for lack of available forces and air control.

The obvious solution for the latter is to retreat behind the Seine (a large French river on the Paris-Le Havre axis) and destroy the bridges. It would then have been very difficult for the allies to pass. It would have delayed their advance. And it's not an invention of mine. Liddell Hart, one of the leading historians of that period wrote in his book "History of the Second World War", page 560 (French edition):

"It is obvious that the Germans would have had plenty of time to retreat to the Seine to form a strong defensive line. If Hitler had not been stubborn in his stupid prohibition "of any retreat". It is thanks to his madness that the Allies were able to regain lost opportunities and liberate France in autumn".

So, it is very likely that the front line on the Seine would not have lasted long, given Allied superiority. But it would have lasted a few more weeks, maybe two or three months. And above all, it would have saved most of the German army and then allowed them to retreat in good order to the Siegfried Line. There, it is not an army in rout that would have faced the allies, but a still relatively solid one, which could have delayed the victory of the allies by several months, even a year.

But, once again, Hitler makes a foolish decision. Indeed, he orders his generals to counter-attack towards Avranches (Operation Lüttich) to cut the allied forces in two and close the opening created to the south-west of the front. Basically, he wants to do this:

Operation Lüttich

If he succeeded, not only would he close the gap, but he could also make prisoner part of the allied troops remaining south of Avranches (red circle), now separated from the rest of the army (orange circle) and therefore without supplies.

The decision is foolish, simply because the Allies have 550,000 soldiers while the Germans have only 250,000, a ratio of simple to double. They have 3,500 tanks while the Germans have only about 350 for the whole front. So the Allies have a very clear numerical superiority and an overwhelming material superiority. And they have total control of the sky, which makes it practically impossible for the Germans to carry out offensives. They are bound to fail. Moreover, the counter-attack is carried out in the Norman bocage, which according to official history has proved to be very unfavorable to the offensive. Finally, the Wehrmacht has not been able to repel the allies during the previous month (on the contrary, it has gradually lost ground). So, with the low resources gathered by Hitler (about 5 divisions and 300 tanks), there is no reason why it can do so over 30 km in August, while the allies are strengthening every day a little more. It is indeed the distance to be bridged until Avranches to close the breach, since at the time of Operation Lüttich (7 August), the allies are already in Mortain.

And if it was an offensive whose failure was of little consequence, why not? But the consequence, here is quite simply a risk of annihilation of the German army by encirclement of almost 100%. The Allies will then be able to rush towards Germany without any opposition. So this is a crazy risk-taking.

But then, instead of retreating his troops as quickly as possible towards the Seine, Hitler decides to counter-attack and brings the bulk of his army to the south-west of the front, i.e. to the bottom of the future fish trap in case of encirclement. And he keeps the rest of his troops on their positions. Moreover, to carry out his offensive, he strips the rest of his divisions of most of their tanks, which greatly increases the risk that the Allies could drive the Germans back at the entrance of the future pocket.

Then comes what was to happen. Because of the control of the air space by the allies and their numerical and material superiority, the offensive is a failure; and the allies, much more mobile, encircle the German forces in what will be called the Falaise pocket (name of a small town located at the entrance of the pocket).

 

 

As you can see on this plan, the majority of German units are at the bottom of the pocket because of the counter-attack.

As the pocket begins to form, instead of retreating, Hitler decides to continue the attack, as can be seen here:

"Mortain's failure left the German XLVIIth Armoured Corps spiked into the Allied position. In spite of common sense, Hitler still refused to retreat eastward, ordering his out-of-fuel tanks to hold their positions. The fighting continued over the next few days, but it was clear that the German forces had fallen into a trap - by shifting their centre of gravity to the western end of the front, they left only a curtain of troops to the north and south. Operation Totalise, launched by the Canadians on the road to Falaise, would try to catch them from behind."

It is only on August 16th, because the allied encirclement maneuver becomes more and more threatening and because the landing of Provence has just begun (the 15th), that Hitler finally decides the general retreat towards the German border. Fortunately for him, the allies took a very long time to close the pocket, which allows him to evacuate a significant number of soldiers.

As for the number of soldiers who managed to escape, the figures vary greatly. Some speak of 20,000 to 40,000 out of the 250,000 in the pocket. For others, the figure is 200,000. There are also intermediate figures of 100,000 or 150,000. That's the big difference. And it is also not clear how many have managed to reach Germany.

But what is certain is that the Germans are then routed, since they flee en masse to Germany, having suffered very heavy material losses. From now on, there is no longer any question of re-establishing themselves on the Seine or the Meuse, but only on the Siegfried Line on the German border, which demonstrates the extent of their defeat. The Allies then begin to rush towards the Siegfried Line. Almost all of France is open to them.

Operation Lüttich, decided by Hitler against the advice of his generals, was therefore of capital importance for the second part of the liberation of France. Without it, the Allied campaign could have been much more difficult and longer. Just look at what happened on the Siegfried Line. It took the Allies months to get through, while Germany lacked everything.

Given what we already know about Hitler, it is clear that, here too, this decision was taken voluntarily to make the German army lose more quickly. It was not the umpteenth huge mistake, but the umpteenth sabotage on Hitler's part.

If this was the only bad decision, quirk, illogicality, impossibility coming from Hitler or linked to Hitler, the idea of a mistake or madness would be credible. But with everything we've already seen on this blog, it couldn't be that. It was obviously sabotage.

 

 

1)    What the press and experts say about it

 

Official history itself acknowledges that the offensive had very little chance of success and that it was decided by Hitler against the advice of his staff, who advocated a retreat of the troops. I put here a few references in case all of a sudden theories that Hitler's idea was quite valid would flourish on the Internet and elsewhere:

We have the Wikipedia page about the Falaise pocket:

"Against all military logic, instead of retreating in order to the river cuts after the American breakthrough, Adolf Hitler imagines an offensive on Mortain. By deciding to do so, he is in fact pushing the German army towards destruction. The Führer has personally taken charge of the military operations in the West since the attack of July 20, 1944, because he has lost all confidence in the soldiers of his staffs. He no longer listens to any advice or warnings. It is therefore a complete plan from Hitler's hand that is addressed to Marshal von Kluge. Mortain's counter-attack, launched on 7 August 1944, was a bitter failure for the Germans, leaving part of their forces dangerously advanced."

 

We also have the Wikipedia page of Mortain's counter-attack (Operation Lüttich):

"Decided by Hitler against the advice of his general staff who advocated a withdrawal of troops, it follows the breakthrough of Avranches by American troops who managed to penetrate Brittany. The German counter-attack will be a bitter failure and will allow the Allies to encircle part of the Wehrmacht in the Falaise pocket."

"Completely unaware of the real state of the German units (worn out by two months of intensive and continuous fighting and without air support), pursuing his fixed ideas, Hitler ordered energetic action from the commander of Army Group B, Feldmarschal von Kluge, Rommel's replacement. The opportunity is too good, one thinks in Berlin."

 

And the English Wikipedia page about Operation Lüttich:

"As the German commanders on the spot had warned Hitler in vain, there was little chance of the attack succeeding, and the concentration of their armoured reserves at the western end of the front in Normandy soon led to disaster, as they were outflanked to their south and the front to their east collapsed, resulting in many of the German troops in Normandy being trapped in the Falaise Pocket."

 

And here:

"German officers, warned of an imminent attack, are particularly pessimistic about the chances of success."

 

Here:

"This Operation, which he code named "Operation Lüttich", was to cut into the side of the 'neck' of the corridor through which American troops were now pouring into central France. Hoping to cut these advancing troops off from their resupply and defeat them, Hitler's General in Normandy protested that launching this attack would cause the complete collapse of the front as the Germans did not have any tanks to spare. The tanks needed would have to be taken from units that were already using them in the front line and with the now constant Allied pressure all along the German front this would only further weaken the German front everywhere and cause more holes to develop. Despite this Hitler refused to change his order and the required tank forces were withdrawn from the Anglo/Canadian front and sent west towards Mortain. As Hitler's Generals had predicted, this withdrawal of German armour from the eastern Normandy side of the front precipitated the start of the rapid Canadian push south to link up with the American forces. This link-up would finally seal the gap between the two Allied Armies and result in the Death and Destruction in the Falaise Pocket of the trapped German Armies there."

 

So there you have it, the fact that it was a stupid decision, or at least one that had very little chance of success, is almost unanimously acknowledged.

 

2)    One of the reasons for the attack on Hitler on July 20, 1944

 

It seems that the explanation for Hitler's stubbornness on Operation Lüttich is partly based on the attack on July 20, only 15 days before.

This is what we can read on the Wikipedia page of Operation Lüttich:

"Marked by the attack of July 20, 1944, which miraculously spared him, Hitler, against the advice of his generals who recommended retreat, decided alone to impose a counterattack. He no longer had any confidence in the high command of the Wehrmacht."

Since Hitler and of course all his generals were members or agents of the elite, there could be no attack from them. So this one is obviously a hoax. There was no attack and no one died.

One of the reasons for this hoax is to participate in the idea that Hitler became increasingly paranoid and unbalanced towards the end of the war, in order to explain all his absurd decisions of that period. But it is quite possible that the date of July 20 was chosen specifically to explain the absurd decision to counterattack towards Avranches.

It is true that the elite could have justified Hitler's decision without this attack. He seemed crazy enough as it was. But it helped to make it more logical.

The problem was that the explanation generally put forward around 1942 and 1943 of Hitler's psychorigidity and amateurism had to start getting pretty worn out. So the Elite had to find additional reasons for some of his new huge strategic mistakes, just to vary. Paranoia and insanity provided this variation while remaining more or less in the same theme.

3)    The fast arrival at the German border

 

History aimed at the general public does not usually talk about the German rout after Falaise. As a result, we don't really know when they arrived at the German border (and therefore their speed of progress). Of course, in specialized books, it is said. So there is information. But in newspapers and books for the general public, it is very rarely the case.

And even in specialized books, authors often don't usually dwell on the spectacular side of the Allied advance, and thus on the fact that the German army was in complete rout.

Here is a map of the Allied advance.

 

We can see that on September 5, only 11 days after the liberation of Paris, the allies were in Brussel, 265 km from Paris. And to the east, they were in Verdun, 220 km from Paris. It is an advance of almost 20 to 25 km per day, which is huge.

By September 8, 1944, only 15 days after the capture of Paris, the allies were already in northern Belgium. This is approximately the front line at that time.

 

Here is a more accurate one as of September 11, 1944.

 

So, it was a total rout, a stampede. It was more or less the French defeat of May-June 1940 in reverse. The Germans were running for the border at full speed.

And the Allies knew it. As a result, no longer having anything to fear from the German army, they did not hesitate to advance at maximum speed. With almost no one in front of them, they advanced north and east like a hot knife through butter.

And so, we can see here that after Falaise, everything was very easy in France (and even in Belgium) for the allies. There was almost no more fighting of any importance in this country, except in Alsace, on the north-east border. Finally, the French campaign ended more or less on August 21, 1944. The rest was a long pursuit of the Wehrmacht until the German border.

This clearly shows the extent of the German defeat at Falaise, and thus the strategic importance of the sabotage carried out by Hitler.

PS (December 29 2020) : the story doesn't end here. Allied generals also made many "mistakes" at Falaise (in fact sabotage). As it is more complicated to prove than with the Hitler's sabotages, the text is way longer. This is why I made it in pdf format. I present it here in french. An english version will follow.

Le sabotage des généraux alliés à la poche de Falaise