mercredi 4 mars 2015

D-Day was staged too (part 2/2)


9) The reason why the German high command didn't react the previous days and during the night of June 5/6



-    Verlaine's message the days preceding June 5


A first element that should have put on alert the German High Command was the message of Verlaine. The first part of it is broadcasted on June 1 at 9pm. Hellmuth Meyer, the intelligence officer of the 15th Army, captures it and understands its meaning. Indeed, a member of the French resistance paid by the Germans explained it to them. Meyer then sends it to Admiral Canaris, head of the German counter intelligence. The 15th Army is immediately put on alert.

Meyer then sends the message to the OKW, the HQ of Rundstedt, and that of Rommel. But even if Jodl sees the message, he doesn't do anything. He orders no warning for the 7th Army. The explanation is that he has assumed that Rundstedt had sent an alert message. Except that the latter had not done so because he thought the HQ of Rommel had. And about Rommel? Well, there is no official reason advanced. In any case, it seems he didn't take the message seriously; which is very strange, since he had said a few days before he thought that the landing would happen in the next 3 weeks.

The nights of 2 and 3 June, the message is transmitted again by the BBC.

June 4, nothing is done either. So for three long days, we have this extraordinary thing that the 15th army is put on alert, but the seventh is not due to malfunctions in the high command.

On June 5, at 9:15 pm (in European time, 10:15 pm UK time), the second part of the message is transmitted. Meyer immediately warns General von Salmuth, who is at the head of the 15th Army. This one puts the 15th army on maximum alert.

Rundstedt's HQ is informed immediately after. But Blumentritt, the Chief of Staff of Rundstedt does not believe in the veracity of the information. According to him, the allies would not be as stupid as to announce the radio landing. What about Rundstedt himself? We do not know. But in any case, the 7th Army is not put on alert by Rundstedt's HQ.

Near 10 pm, Meyer warns almost everyone (OKW, headquarters of Army Group B, etc ...) with the following message: "Teletype No 2117/26. Urgent. Message of BBC, 21.15, June 5 has been decoded. According to our available records it means "Expect invasion within 48 hours, starting 00.00, June 6".

One would think that he would also warn the 7th Army and 84th corps. But this action depends on the HQ of Army Group B (Speidel). This said, as this one was better disposed than Blumentritt, there was a hope that via the headquarters of Army Group B, the 7th Army be put on alert. But Speidel doesn't give them the information in question.


And so, during 5 days, the 7th Army wasn't put on alert. And not only that, but neither Rundstedt's headquarters in Saint-Germain en Laye, nor Kriegsmarine in Paris, nor Rommel's headquarters at La Roche-Guyon, nor OKW shows any reaction. It's a little too extraordinary to be true. This kind of thing doesn't happen, unless it's wanted.

And suddenly, the absence of various generals becomes even more suspicious. There is a warning that is given about an imminent landing, and yet, Rommel goes to Germany, the generals of the 7th Army leave to make a war game, and Admiral Krancke goes to Bordeaux? The least they should have done would have been to stay, just in case; especially since it's not as if they were unaware that the landing was going to take place soon.

Moreover, for the first part of the message, ok, there was a malfunction in the transmission of orders; but for the second, no putting the 7th Army on alert comes from the choice of Rundstedt's HQ. However, if he felt the need to put on alert the 15th army it is because he thought that despite the bad weather, a landing was possible. So why put the 15th Army on alert and not the 7th? Well, because it was essential to avoid that the 7th be; because then it could have caused the failure of the landing. So even if it introduced a big inconsistency, Jewish leaders preferred to do like that. They probably thought that anyway, it would suffice to say that the entire German high command didn't believe that the invasion would happen the following days, and that this explanation would go off without a hitch. And also, it would only be a nth detail which wouldn't be noticed and would only be known by a few specialists.

Blumentritt is supposed to have said it was ridiculous that the Allies announce the day of landing by radio. Except that it wasn't absurd at all, since it was necessary to warn the resistance as soon as possible so that they begin to sabotage the railways and the German communications. As if a general with the experience of Blumentritt could ignore it. And indeed, that's what has been going on for several days. Sabotage actions had multiplied in Normandy and Blumentritt was well placed to know it. And also, if the message is encrypted, no matter it is read by the enemy. But Blumentritt was certainly in the conspiracy and voluntarily played the naïve.


D-Day was staged too (part 1/2)


Since the result of the landing could be quite random, once again, Jewish leaders had to stage the event. 

A failure of the landing was out of the question. Indeed, the USSR was about to crush Germany. And as it would have taken a year or two to repeat a similar operation, it would have been very difficult to justify a stagnation of the Eastern Front during all this time. And without a stagnating front, the USSR would have conquered most of Europe, and would have put communist governments everywhere. And such a thing was not part of the plans of Jewish leaders. And if Stalin had put communist governments in some countries and not in others, again it would have been difficult to justify. 

So, Hitler and the German High Command had to help the Allies win, by reacting too slowly and inadequately. That's why, once again, we see the presence of many quirks, inconsistencies, "errors" too numerous and too big to be honest, as well as hazards a little too good to be true; all this, mainly on the German side of course, but not only.


1) Before the landing: staged disagreements between Rommel and Rundstedt


The failure of the Germans against the landing comes not only from mistakes made during June 6, but of course also from those made before. The Jewish leaders had to set up a losing strategy before the events happen. That makes sense. Sabotage organized by them on D-Day was in the right direction, but it was not enough. They had to optimize far more the organization of the German failure. And for that, they had to organize things in advance. 

One of the most significant errors comes from Hitler's arbitration of the disagreement between Rommel and Rundstedt regarding the strategy; disagreement certainly also staged. 

Rommel argued that everything would happen on the D-day, and that after, all would be lost, particularly because of Allied aircraft. He therefore recommended maintaining the German divisions closer to the beaches, in order to crush the landing in the bud. 

Rundstedt, his superior, argued instead that it was impossible to defend the beaches, because of the power of the allied naval artillery. He also thought that at one moment of their advance, the allied forces would be more or less disorganized and therefore winnable. As a result, he advocated attacking them soon after their first attack, once the Navy could no longer support them. 

So it was for Hitler to decide. And of course, he made sure to take the worst decision possible in order to make allies win. 

Indeed, he chose to compromise and take a bit of Rommel's plan and a little from that of Rundstedt. Thus, he left some divisions on the beaches and put some other ones behind, in the inner land. 

Thus, the troops on the beaches were not powerful enough to repel the Allies to the sea, and the remaining troops in the back were not able either to defeat them once bridgeheads created. So the troops near the beaches were sure to be defeated and those located further inland too. 


But that's not all. Hitler also complicated the decision circuit for his armies located in the west of Europe. Indeed, he insisted that the Panzer troop's reserves be placed under his direct orders. They therefore could not move without his approval.


click for larger image


It already posed a problem in itself, since managing divisions located 1,800 km away makes necessarily the commandment less effective. But above all, because Hitler was asleep during the early hours of D-day, and after that, because he was slow to give the order to move them, they remained stuck for hours before being able to intervene, letting the allies quietly create their bridgeheads. Obviously, this too was wanted. Hitler chose this organization to ensure that critical units would be paralyzed during the D-day in order to let the allies win. 

Incidentally, some of these armored divisions will be put very far back, as the Panzer Lehr, which will be located about 130 km from the landing beaches, the 116th Panzer Division, located 130 km away, near Rouen, and especially the second panzer division (320 km); too far away to intervene quickly enough on D-Day. It happens that, among these units, there are two that belong to the reserve of Army Group B, and are therefore immediately available, without having to refer to Hitler. If for the 116th, one can understand the need to cover the area near Dieppe, the placement of the second division is completely illogical.