lundi 21 septembre 2020

The second part of the liberation of France in 1944: Operation Lüttich, another sabotage by Hitler


I talked about the first part of the liberation of France in my article on the landing. I thought that after that, things weren't so interesting anymore. But when I watched a documentary in the summer of 2019, I realized that there were a few elements worthy of interest that showed once again that Hitler was an agent in the service of the elite.

This documentary was about Operation Lüttich, decided by Hitler and which took place from August 7 to 13, 1944, just one week after the Allies began to break through the front in southern Normandy. Some could think it is only one battle among others, and therefore only of moderate interest. That's what I thought at the beginning of the documentary. But in fact, it was this battle that decided of the rest of the French campaign and was the last major battle at that time.

The situation was as follows. After the landing on June 6, 1944, the Allies advanced for two or three weeks. Then they were stuck in the Normandy bocage and could only advance very slowly for about a month (June-July).

Then, between 25 and 31 July, they finally managed to make a breakthrough to the south-west of the front, towards Avranches (Operation Cobra). At the beginning of August, they began to spread south, east and north.


The situation is then catastrophic for the Germans. Indeed, if they stay on their positions, they are sure to be surrounded and lose more than half of their troops, or even almost all of them. Here is the front line as of July 31:




What is almost certain to happen is a large encircling movement on the part of the allies (red arrow).



mercredi 4 mars 2015

D-Day was staged too (part 2/2)

9) The reason why the German high command didn't react the previous days and during the night of June 5/6

-    Verlaine's message the days preceding June 5

A first element that should have put on alert the German High Command was the message of Verlaine. The first part of it is broadcasted on June 1 at 9pm. Hellmuth Meyer, the intelligence officer of the 15th Army, captures it and understands its meaning. Indeed, a member of the French resistance paid by the Germans explained it to them. Meyer then sends it to Admiral Canaris, head of the German counter intelligence. The 15th Army is immediately put on alert.

Meyer then sends the message to the OKW, the HQ of Rundstedt, and that of Rommel. But even if Jodl sees the message, he doesn't do anything. He orders no warning for the 7th Army. The explanation is that he has assumed that Rundstedt had sent an alert message. Except that the latter had not done so because he thought the HQ of Rommel had. And about Rommel? Well, there is no official reason advanced. In any case, it seems he didn't take the message seriously; which is very strange, since he had said a few days before he thought that the landing would happen in the next 3 weeks.

The nights of 2 and 3 June, the message is transmitted again by the BBC.

June 4, nothing is done either. So for three long days, we have this extraordinary thing that the 15th army is put on alert, but the seventh is not due to malfunctions in the high command.

On June 5, at 9:15 pm (in European time, 10:15 pm UK time), the second part of the message is transmitted. Meyer immediately warns General von Salmuth, who is at the head of the 15th Army. This one puts the 15th army on maximum alert.

Rundstedt's HQ is informed immediately after. But Blumentritt, the Chief of Staff of Rundstedt does not believe in the veracity of the information. According to him, the allies would not be as stupid as to announce the radio landing. What about Rundstedt himself? We do not know. But in any case, the 7th Army is not put on alert by Rundstedt's HQ.

Near 10 pm, Meyer warns almost everyone (OKW, headquarters of Army Group B, etc ...) with the following message: "Teletype No 2117/26. Urgent. Message of BBC, 21.15, June 5 has been decoded. According to our available records it means "Expect invasion within 48 hours, starting 00.00, June 6".

One would think that he would also warn the 7th Army and 84th corps. But this action depends on the HQ of Army Group B (Speidel). This said, as this one was better disposed than Blumentritt, there was a hope that via the headquarters of Army Group B, the 7th Army be put on alert. But Speidel doesn't give them the information in question.

And so, during 5 days, the 7th Army wasn't put on alert. And not only that, but neither Rundstedt's headquarters in Saint-Germain en Laye, nor Kriegsmarine in Paris, nor Rommel's headquarters at La Roche-Guyon, nor OKW shows any reaction. It's a little too extraordinary to be true. This kind of thing doesn't happen, unless it's wanted.

And suddenly, the absence of various generals becomes even more suspicious. There is a warning that is given about an imminent landing, and yet, Rommel goes to Germany, the generals of the 7th Army leave to make a war game, and Admiral Krancke goes to Bordeaux? The least they should have done would have been to stay, just in case; especially since it's not as if they were unaware that the landing was going to take place soon.

Moreover, for the first part of the message, ok, there was a malfunction in the transmission of orders; but for the second, no putting the 7th Army on alert comes from the choice of Rundstedt's HQ. However, if he felt the need to put on alert the 15th army it is because he thought that despite the bad weather, a landing was possible. So why put the 15th Army on alert and not the 7th? Well, because it was essential to avoid that the 7th be; because then it could have caused the failure of the landing. So even if it introduced a big inconsistency, Jewish leaders preferred to do like that. They probably thought that anyway, it would suffice to say that the entire German high command didn't believe that the invasion would happen the following days, and that this explanation would go off without a hitch. And also, it would only be a nth detail which wouldn't be noticed and would only be known by a few specialists.

Blumentritt is supposed to have said it was ridiculous that the Allies announce the day of landing by radio. Except that it wasn't absurd at all, since it was necessary to warn the resistance as soon as possible so that they begin to sabotage the railways and the German communications. As if a general with the experience of Blumentritt could ignore it. And indeed, that's what has been going on for several days. Sabotage actions had multiplied in Normandy and Blumentritt was well placed to know it. And also, if the message is encrypted, no matter it is read by the enemy. But Blumentritt was certainly in the conspiracy and voluntarily played the naïve.

D-Day was staged too (part 1/2)

Since the result of the landing could be quite random, once again, Jewish leaders had to stage the event. 

A failure of the landing was out of the question. Indeed, the USSR was about to crush Germany. And as it would have taken a year or two to repeat a similar operation, it would have been very difficult to justify a stagnation of the Eastern Front during all this time. And without a stagnating front, the USSR would have conquered most of Europe, and would have put communist governments everywhere. And such a thing was not part of the plans of Jewish leaders. And if Stalin had put communist governments in some countries and not in others, again it would have been difficult to justify. 

So, Hitler and the German High Command had to help the Allies win, by reacting too slowly and inadequately. That's why, once again, we see the presence of many quirks, inconsistencies, "errors" too numerous and too big to be honest, as well as hazards a little too good to be true; all this, mainly on the German side of course, but not only.

1) Before the landing: staged disagreements between Rommel and Rundstedt

The failure of the Germans against the landing comes not only from mistakes made during June 6, but of course also from those made before. The Jewish leaders had to set up a losing strategy before the events happen. That makes sense. Sabotage organized by them on D-Day was in the right direction, but it was not enough. They had to optimize far more the organization of the German failure. And for that, they had to organize things in advance. 

One of the most significant errors comes from Hitler's arbitration of the disagreement between Rommel and Rundstedt regarding the strategy; disagreement certainly also staged. 

Rommel argued that everything would happen on the D-day, and that after, all would be lost, particularly because of Allied aircraft. He therefore recommended maintaining the German divisions closer to the beaches, in order to crush the landing in the bud. 

Rundstedt, his superior, argued instead that it was impossible to defend the beaches, because of the power of the allied naval artillery. He also thought that at one moment of their advance, the allied forces would be more or less disorganized and therefore winnable. As a result, he advocated attacking them soon after their first attack, once the Navy could no longer support them. 

So it was for Hitler to decide. And of course, he made sure to take the worst decision possible in order to make allies win. 

Indeed, he chose to compromise and take a bit of Rommel's plan and a little from that of Rundstedt. Thus, he left some divisions on the beaches and put some other ones behind, in the inner land. 

Thus, the troops on the beaches were not powerful enough to repel the Allies to the sea, and the remaining troops in the back were not able either to defeat them once bridgeheads created. So the troops near the beaches were sure to be defeated and those located further inland too. 

But that's not all. Hitler also complicated the decision circuit for his armies located in the west of Europe. Indeed, he insisted that the Panzer troop's reserves be placed under his direct orders. They therefore could not move without his approval.

click for larger image

It already posed a problem in itself, since managing divisions located 1,800 km away makes necessarily the commandment less effective. But above all, because Hitler was asleep during the early hours of D-day, and after that, because he was slow to give the order to move them, they remained stuck for hours before being able to intervene, letting the allies quietly create their bridgeheads. Obviously, this too was wanted. Hitler chose this organization to ensure that critical units would be paralyzed during the D-day in order to let the allies win. 

Incidentally, some of these armored divisions will be put very far back, as the Panzer Lehr, which will be located about 130 km from the landing beaches, the 116th Panzer Division, located 130 km away, near Rouen, and especially the second panzer division (320 km); too far away to intervene quickly enough on D-Day. It happens that, among these units, there are two that belong to the reserve of Army Group B, and are therefore immediately available, without having to refer to Hitler. If for the 116th, one can understand the need to cover the area near Dieppe, the placement of the second division is completely illogical.

samedi 14 septembre 2013

The sleazy things regarding the invasion of Italy

Allies invaded Italy on 3 September 1943.

At first sight, the invasion of Italy seems normal. It seems logical that the Allies wanted to open a second front right away.

But when you study more closely how things happened, you see that, once again, there is something fishy.

The fishy thing is the fact that just when the Allies were on the verge of invading Italy, Mussolini was thrown out of the power.

And what is fishier is how things happened. On 24 July 1943, The Grand Council of Fascism met. It was the first time that this body had met since the start of the war. One of the resolutions on the agenda asked the king to resume his full constitutional powers; to the detriment of Mussolini of course. This motion carried by a 19-7 margin. The next day, Mussolini was arrested by Carabinieri on king's orders.

The problem is that such things can't happen. It's just ridiculous. Mussolini would have seen the motion proposal on the agenda of the meeting. And faithful subordinates would have warned him about it. Then, Mussolini would have immediately put in jail or more probably killed the guys who had proposed the meeting.

Even if he had let the Council meet, he would have sent the conspirators to prison during the Council, or just after (or killed them).

Even the demand of a Grand Council of Fascism meeting, at this very moment would have obviously seemed extremely suspicious for Mussolini, or for anybody with an IQ above 20. You are losing the war, the national territory is now under attack, and someone wants suddenly to meet the Grand Council, a council whish hasn't met since the beginning of the war? You would of course think: "Hey guys, aren't you trying to oust me from power? Do you really think I'm gonna let you do this"?

Those guys would in fact never have dared to meet the council. They would have been sure that Mussolini would have made them killed for treason right away.

And they would have known that Hitler would send his troops in Italy and would destroy their work after just one week, making all those efforts and risks totally worthless. And the German troops being already present in Italy, the conspirators would have known they had a high risk of being taken by them and being executed.

jeudi 12 septembre 2013

Hitler's strategic mistakes between 1941 and 1942 in Russia were made on purpose

As we have already seen it, Hitler was just a lieutenant of Jewish leaders (as Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Blum, Mussolini, Franco, etc…). His main role was to allow the creation of Israel and to push ordinary jews to emigrate there. Once his work accomplished, he wouldn't be needed anymore. So, his role as Nazi leader was meant to last only a limited period of time. It means he had to succeed at the beginning, and then to start losing. As all the sides were under control, the entire war was staged (by Jewish leaders).

Regarding the Russian campaign, Hitler's army was supposed to be vastly superior and to have great successes at the beginning, and very soon after, to stop winning. As the result couldn't be left to chance, Hitler the Jewish agent (and his generals) had to make voluntary mistakes in order to lose at the end. Same thing for Stalin.

Let's see the official history.

Before Operation Barbarossa

Even before the Russian campaign, Hitler has made errors.

He doesn't mobilize all Germany. This will lead to a lack of soldiers during Barbarossa and after. It will also lead to a lack of equipment.

German tanks have a very complicated design; thus, they are produced extremely slowly. Whereas Russian tanks are much more standardized and can be produced en masse.

Even if German soldiers were trained in Russia during the rearmament period, it seems that German generals don't know the rasputitsa (moment of the year when the ground becomes very muddy). Therefore, their tanks aren't adapted to it. 

1941: operation Barbarossa

Anyway, Hitler invades Russia in June 22 1941. Stalin is totally surprised by the invasion, thus the Russian army is unprepared. Because of that, the disorganization is complete. The German army is also largely superior to the Russian one (better organization, more mobile, better officers, etc…). It allows Germans forces to win easily at first, using blitzkrieg strategy.

There are three German army groups (north, center, and south).

Army Group Center is the most powerful. It's the one which makes most of the prisoners. By using blitzkrieg, they encircle Russians at Bialystok and Minsk between 22nd June and 3rd July and make at first 420.000 soldiers. 1.500 canons, 2.500 tanks and 1.669 airplanes are also captured. But, the encirclement is not perfect and many soldiers are able to escape, thus, only 290.000 are taken at the end.

For Army Group North, the strategy was different. They weren't supposed to encircle Russian troops, but to make a breakthrough with the panzers and make them advance as quickly as possible toward Leningrad.

Army Group South beats Russian at Brody, between June 23-29. The 9th July, they are at 75 km of Kiev and 40 km after Ternopil.

As Germany shouldn't win, first mistakes and fatalities had to happen after the first success. Otherwise, Germans would have won very quickly.

mercredi 31 juillet 2013

The strange clemency of the USA and Britain toward Germany after World War I

Just after WWI, the treaty of Versailles (June 1919) forced Germany to pay reparations to several countries it had fought. Germany had to pay 20 billion gold-marks before May 1921. A commission had to estimate the total amount of reparations Germany would finally pay. In 1921, at the conference of London, the final estimation of the amount due was 132 billion gold-marks. The repartition was the following: France 52 %, England 22 %, Belgium 10 %, Italy 8 %, and 8 % for other Allies.

But, immediately, voices in England said the reparations were unfair for Germany and bad for the European economy. It started with a book from the famous economist John Maynard Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace" (1919), which knew a great success.

Those fears about economic problems caused by the payment of reparations seemed to become real when hyperinflation hit Germany (between 1923 and 1924). At least, the USA and England seemed to think so. Then, Germany declared it could not pay the reparations and asked for a moratorium.

Quickly, the USA, more and more followed by England, didn't stop pushing for a decrease of the amount of reparations and finally, for an annulation of them.

France, on the other side, which had been hit very hard by the war, defended the idea that reparations had to be paid until the last gold-mark. When Germany said in 1923 it couldn't pay, France, with Belgium, invaded the Ruhr in order to get paid (by taking control of mines, industries, etc…). But, being under the pressure of the USA and England and isolated diplomatically, France finally evacuated the Ruhr in 1925. And progressively, it accepted more and more decreases of the German reparations, until finally, the payment ceased.

So, the USA and England were indeed very merciful with Germany.

mercredi 24 juillet 2013

Yes, 99 % of websites saying Hitler was a jew or an agent are made by jews

In the nationalist community, many people say that the stories of Hitler being a jew are bullshit, because they are told by jews. In the conspirationist community they say they are told by jews, or illuminati agents or CIA agents, etc… So, for them, those stories are phony.

And yes, they are right.

Indeed, 99 % of the websites saying Hitler was a jew are run by jews and are talking bullshit.

So, it is perfectly understandable that most of those people think that Hitler wasn't a jew or an agent and that those stories are phony.

In the conspirationist community, people are more receptive to the idea that Hitler was a jew or a mason. So, there are much more people believing that Hitler was not what he seemed to be than in the nationalist community. But usually, they are more easily deceived about the whole story than nationalists who have begun to understand what all this was about.

The question is: why would Jewish leaders do such a thing?

At first sight, it doesn't make any sense.

If it was false, if Hitler was really a Gentile Nazi, why would Jewish leaders make so many websites of this kind? It wouldn't make any sense. I mean, they have a golden story. With Hitler being a real Gentile Nazi, they have the perfect Gentile bad guy. They can make Gentiles feel guilty during centuries about the bad Hitler killing poor jews, and the vile Gentiles doing nothing to stop him. They have the perfect incarnation of evil. It has worked perfectly well for 60 years. Why would they kill the goose that lays the golden eggs? Why introduce confusion?