samedi 14 septembre 2013

The sleazy things regarding the invasion of Italy

Allies invaded Italy on 3 September 1943.

At first sight, the invasion of Italy seems normal. It seems logical that the Allies wanted to open a second front right away.

But when you study more closely how things happened, you see that, once again, there is something fishy.

The fishy thing is the fact that just when the Allies were on the verge of invading Italy, Mussolini was thrown out of the power.

And what is fishier is how things happened. On 24 July 1943, The Grand Council of Fascism met. It was the first time that this body had met since the start of the war. One of the resolutions on the agenda asked the king to resume his full constitutional powers; to the detriment of Mussolini of course. This motion carried by a 19-7 margin. The next day, Mussolini was arrested by Carabinieri on king's orders.

The problem is that such things can't happen. It's just ridiculous. Mussolini would have seen the motion proposal on the agenda of the meeting. And faithful subordinates would have warned him about it. Then, Mussolini would have immediately put in jail or more probably killed the guys who had proposed the meeting.

Even if he had let the Council meet, he would have sent the conspirators to prison during the Council, or just after (or killed them).

Even the demand of a Grand Council of Fascism meeting, at this very moment would have obviously seemed extremely suspicious for Mussolini, or for anybody with an IQ above 20. You are losing the war, the national territory is now under attack, and someone wants suddenly to meet the Grand Council, a council whish hasn't met since the beginning of the war? You would of course think: "Hey guys, aren't you trying to oust me from power? Do you really think I'm gonna let you do this"?

Those guys would in fact never have dared to meet the council. They would have been sure that Mussolini would have made them killed for treason right away.

And they would have known that Hitler would send his troops in Italy and would destroy their work after just one week, making all those efforts and risks totally worthless. And the German troops being already present in Italy, the conspirators would have known they had a high risk of being taken by them and being executed.

There would have also been a great risk that most Italian generals would have remained faithful to Mussolini and would have arrested the conspirators immediately. They would have known this and wouldn't have dared to take such a risk. As the plan was only between the King and some politicians, and thus as the army was almost not involved, most generals would have regarded this as a coup and would have stayed faithful to Mussolini.

It is said in Wikipedia that Mussolini was informed by people devoted to him, agents of the OVRA and the Germans that plots were going on. Thus, he was certainly informed about what was being prepared and he would have crushed right away the conspiracy against him. So, you can't even invoke the surprise from Mussolini.

To explain the very fishy behavior of Mussolini, Jewish leaders have propagated the idea that he was depressed because Italy was losing the war; and thus was very apathetic. But this explanation sounds very lousy and phony. When you keep the power during 20 years, you don't let it go so easily. You are used to fight for it. And you don't let it go especially when you know that otherwise you will much probably be judged and executed very soon (your enemy can promise you safety, you know you can't trust them). He knew the war was a fight to the death, not only for Italy, but also for him. And he wasn't of the suicidal kind.

So, it's clear that the fall of Mussolini was staged by Jewish leaders. They ordered him to leave the power. He would have never left it so easily without an order from them. And the conspirators were of course jews too (and thus knew they didn't take any risk in doing this).

The question is why Jewish leaders wanted him to do that?

My opinion is that they did that because of D-day (Normandy landing of June 1944).

Their first problem was that even if they controlled each side, they didn't control every level of the German army. And the second problem is the success of a landing is something very hazardous during the first days. So, if there had been, let's say, just 200.000 more Axis soldiers in Normandy, with some uncontrolled Colonels and low-rank generals resisting too well, a failure would have been possible. So, we can think that in order to be sure to avoid a failure of the D-day, they tried to get as few Axis soldiers as possible in Normandy.

The problem here is you can think that, anyway, Germans only had already very few reserves in 1943, and thus could send very few soldiers in Normandy in order to wait for a possible landing. Same thing with Mussolini. You can think he didn't have many troops left to be sent in Normandy. So, there was no special need to invade Italy in order to force Germany and Italy to have troops locked there.

But when you know certain figures, things become very different. Hitler was able to send 600.000 German soldiers in Italy in order to fight against Allies. And Italy had not less than 4 million soldiers. So, without the invasion of Italy, we can think that at least 150.000 German soldiers could have been sent in Normandy and 200.000 Italians, that is 350.000. Of course, Jewish leaders could have avoided sending those troops in Normandy. But it would have seemed strange.

And with the Luftwaffe much less exhausted without the Italian war, Allied forces wouldn't have got total air superiority. The German war machine would also have been in a better shape, since it would have been less bombed in some areas.

Then Allies could have failed during the D-day. It could have been a success, but there would have been a non-negligible risk of failure.

Such a risk was inacceptable for Jewish leaders. This is why they staged the fall of Mussolini, and after that, the invasion of Italy (before all this, the invasion of Sicily was of course required to justify the fall of Mussolini).

The fall of Mussolini was crucial, because without it, Italy was still a fascist state enemy of Allied countries. Thus, there were still the 4 million soldiers ready to fight for Italy. Even if Jewish leaders had sold the idea that Italian soldiers were of low quality, and even cowards, it would have been quite difficult to make Italy be invaded so easily without the thing seeming fishy (especially with Germans helping them). And, here too, the success of the landing would have been hazardous. But with Italy's new government being a friend of Allies, the landing was not a problem anymore, since the troops were ordered not to fight. And the 4 million soldiers weren't a threat anymore either.

This is why Jewish leaders ordered Sicily to be taken. It allowed them to justify the fall of Mussolini. And the fall of Mussolini allowed: 1) Allied troops to land on Italy almost without any risk; 2) to make disappear the problem of the 4 million Italian soldiers; 3) Then with the invasion of Italy and the disappearance of the 4 million Italian soldiers' threat, they could force Hitler to send 600.000 German soldiers in Italy.

One month after the staged replacement of Mussolini (24 July 1943), the new Italian government concluded an armistice with the Allies (3 September 1943). The Allied troops landed on Italy the same day at Reggio Calabria (Operation Baytown). It is said that, as the armistice was made public only on 9 September 1943, the landing at Reggio Calabria was not impacted by it. But, we can think that Italian troops were secretly ordered to fight as little as possible. There were few German troops there, but they were ordered to retreat, because the German Headquarters thought the main attack would happen at Salerno. After that, Allies landed at Taranto on 9 September 1943 (Operation Slapstick). Because of the armistice, there was virtually no opposition. Within 48 hours of landing at Taranto, the airborne division reached and occupied the port of Brindisi and Bari (80 km north-east of Taranto) on the Adriatic coast without opposition from the Italian or German defenders. The 8th army, which had landed at Reggio Calabria, was able to march 300 miles north to the Salerno area with no opposition other than engineer obstacles. So, as planned by Jewish leaders, the fall of Mussolini made the landing in Italy, and after that the march toward the north, very easy.


Then, Germany was forced to send 600.000 soldiers in Italy. The former 4 million soldiers army of Italy had almost ceased to exist (after the rescue of Mussolini by Germans, only 100.000 Italian soldiers were found to fight with Germans). The Luftwaffe was completely exhausted by this new effort. Thus, Germans weren't able to send any more troops in France; and they couldn't ask Mussolini to send Italian troops in Normandy either. So, there was no risk anymore that the D-day could fail.

Another sleazy thing is timing of the coup d'état. Normally, you would have expected it to be made after the end of the Sicily's invasion, for example on 25 August 1943. Then, the armistice with the Allies could have been concluded almost right away; Germans wouldn't have got enough time to send reinforcements, and the Allies could have invaded the entire Italy easily. But no, the coup was made at least one month before the moment Allies could invade Italy (they were busy invading Sicily). This let Germans plenty of time to send a lot of troops and to be able to prevent Allies to conquer the entire Italian territory.

Of course the men behind the coup couldn't ignore things would happen this way and that it would lead to a long battle on the Italian territory. So, they voluntarily made their coup at the wrong moment.

So, we can think that things happened this way because it was planned by Jewish leaders. They probably didn't want to let the Allies conquer the entire Italy as soon as 1943, because then, their agenda would have been quite disturbed. Germany could have been almost paralyzed by the bombings. And the Allies could possibly have crushed the German armies in the North of Italy, or could have been able to land on the coasts of Croatia or of France. Then, the Allies could have invaded Germany long before 1945. They could have made it in 1944, when Russians were still in Poland. And as Jewish leaders had already planned that USSR would control a half of Europe, they didn't wanted Allies to control All Germany and maybe a part of Balkans. Of course, Jewish leaders could have arranged things in order to prevent this from happening. But it would have introduced more fishy events.

So, to avoid this, Jewish leaders had to make the coup d'état happen one or two months before the invasion of Italy by the Allies, in order to give Hitler enough time to send troops.

The problem is that it introduces an inconsistency. Normally, conspirators wouldn't have chosen this moment to make their coup. They would have made it later, when they were sure that Allies could invade Italy right away. So, the timing of the coup d'état is very sleazy.

The timing was fishy for another reason: the coup was organized in a very short time. The conspiracy began on 4 June 1943, when the king Victor Emmanuel III suggested Dino Grandi that a vote at the Grand Council of Fascism could permit him to depose Mussolini. So, it took only one month and twenty days to carry out the coup d'état: too quick to be true. Usually, such things are prepared during at least 6 months, time to convince important people to follow the first conspirators. Because, when you are a conspirator leaving in a dictatorship, you are very cautious. Any guy you reveal your intention to could denounce you and make you arrested and killed. But as all this was staged, the conspirators knew they didn't risk anything (most of the guys who were supposedly killed in fact weren't) and that everything would go fine.

But in fact, we can consider that the plot was carried out in a shorter time than that. Neither Victor Emmanuel III nor Grandi could know that the Allies would invade Sicily on 10 July 1943. And they couldn't know either that Sicily would fall so quickly. So, the 4 June 1943, the plot could only be something still vague. Things were accelerated only when Sicily was invaded. But then, it means that the coup was organized in only 14 days. Not credible. Even, if we accept to think that things were already more precise at the beginning of July, it still makes only 24 days and it is still incredible.

Of course, Jewish leaders could have made the landing on Italy happen only in October or November. Then, the coup d'état could have been carried out later and his timing would have been less sleazy. But then, it would have been strange that Hitler wouldn't have already sent troops in Italy. As Hitler had seen how Italian troops had collapsed so easily in Sicily, he couldn't have waited the invasion of Italy without doing something. And with a lot of German troops already in Italy, the coup could never have been made;

Of course, at the end of the war, Mussolini wasn't killed, as official history would like us to believe. They most probably took someone who looked like him. And as it wasn't enough, they disfigured him in order to make him unrecognizable by people. As Mussolini was a jew (like Hitler or Franco), Jewish leaders wouldn't have killed him. Otherwise, high rank jews like him wouldn't want anymore to serve Jewish leaders. So, they faked his death, and sent him somewhere else (as they did with Hitler). This is something Jewish leaders have also made nowadays with the jews Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi.

We can also think that the weak resistance in Sicily was staged. Maybe Mussolini didn't put enough troops there, or didn't give clear orders of resisting as much as possible. It is said that he was very apathetic during the invasion.

You could think that the invasion of Italy had also the purpose of decreasing the pressure on Russian armies. But Jewish leaders could make Hitler take wrong decisions leading to massive losses of troops. So, I don't think the Russian front was the main goal of Italy's invasion.

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